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Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE.
The appellant seeks a reversal of a judgment entered in
the Second District Court, in and for the County of Davis,
State of Utah, which held that in an action to recover reasonable compensation and expenses for appointed counsel of
three indigent persons, the fees set forth in the Davis County
Criminal Defense Plan are not unreasonable, nor does the
plan fail to comply with State law requiring counties to provide adequate defense for indigents charged with commission
of crimes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Calvin Gould, sitting without a jury,
heard this case and ruled that Davis County was not arbi-

trary or capricious or unreasonable in adopting standards
for the Davis County Criminal Defense Program patterned
after the Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964; and that
Davis County had substantially complied with Chapter 64 of
Title 77, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, in adopting that plan.
The trial court held that under the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 77-64-6, payment of
$15 .00 per hour for in-court work and $10.00 per hour for
out-of-court work was not unreasonable compensation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and appellant seeks to reverse the trial Court's
judgment that the fees set forth in the Davis County Criminal Defense Plan are not unreasonable and asks this High
Court to hold that the reasonableness of compensation paid
attorneys in such cases must be determined by testimony
concerning the reasonableness of fees charges, which in this
case appellant alleges to be $25 .00 per hour.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, who is an attorney licensed to practice
law in the State of Utah, was appointed by Honorable
Thornley K. Swan, a judge in the District Court for the
Second Judicial District of the State of Utah, to defend
three indigent persons charged with the commission of
crimes in Davis County, Utah. (R. 37-38).
Appellant then submitted to the Davis County Commission, claims for compensation at the rate of $25.00 per
hour for his time expended on the cases and for full reimbursement of costs, (R. 37, 38, 42, Ex. "A", "B", "C").
The Davis County Commission rejected appellant's claims
because they exceeded the amounts allowed in the Davis
County Criminal Defense Program for compensating attorneys who represented indigent clients, (R. 6).
2

The Davis County Commission in fulfilling the statutory
obligation, as set forth in Section 77-64-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, to provide counsel for indigent
clients, adopted the Davis County Criminal Defense Program,
(R. 6). Such action on the Commission's part in establishing the Program was laudable and commendable in that it
placed Davis County beyond many others in complying with
the legislative mandate, (T. 6). The program also provides
that attorneys should be paid $10.00 per hour for time expended out of court and $15 .00 per hour for time expended
in court, plus reasonably expended expenses, (R. 42, Defendant's Ex. 2 (Davis County Criminal Defense Program, p. 9) ).
Both Commissioner Smoot and Mr. Peterson, the Davis
County Attorney (who was instrumental in drafting the
Davis County Criminal Defense Program), testified at trial
that the Davis County Bar Association was consulted regarding the reasonableness of the fee schedule set forth in the
program, (T. 22, T. 28, T. 44, T. 45). They also testified
about a study conducted as to what fixed costs would be in
establishing a legal defense office in Davis County, (T. 35,
T. 52). Mr. Peterson also testified that on the basis of personal experience in operating a law office, the fee schedule
contained in the Davis County Criminal Defense Program
was reasonable, (T. 54, T. 55).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DA VIS COUNTY CRIMINAL DEFENSE PROGRAM IS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF 77-646 (l ), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, (T. 11, T. 12).
The Davis County Criminal Defense Program is valid be3

cause it was established pursuant to the provisions of subsection 77-64-6 (1) of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, (T. 11, T. 12).
This statute reads as follows:
"The board of County Commissioners may, at county
expense, either:
( 1) Authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this act by appointing a qualified attorney in each case and awarding him reasonable compensation and expenses; or ... "
On the basis of the above-cited statute, the Davis County
Commissioners adopted Resolution # 387, and the Davis
County Criminal Defense Program, both of which gave the
court authority to appoint qualified counsel, (R. 42, Defend·
ant's Ex. 1, (Resolution #387, approved March 22, 1968,
Section 4) and R. 42, Defendant's Ex. 2 (Davis County Crim·
inal Defense Program, p. 2) ).
It will be noted from the foregoing that the district

judge, not the County Commissioners, was responsible for
appointing counsel. Also since the adoption of the Davis
County Criminal Defense Program, the Davis County Commission has had no involvement in attempting to control
attorneys who would and who would not be appointed in
cases, (T. 26).
Appellant, however, alleges that the Davis County Com·
mission "attempted to control who should and should not
be appointed as counsel to defend indigent defendants",
(Brief of Appellant, p. 9). As "proof" of such attempted
control, appellant quotes part of a letter sent to Judge
Thornley K. Swan by the Commission, (Brief of Appellant,
p. 9-10). Thus, according to the Appellant, the County
Commissioners supposedly "attempted to exercise duties
assigned to the judiciary ... " (Brief of Appellant, p. 10).
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As will be discussed infra, under U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 77-64-6 (1 ), the County Commissioners are charged
with the responsibility of compensating court-appointed counsel. And yet, in this case, the Commission was confronted
with court-appointed counsel who continually expressed to
the Commission his inability to accept from the Commission
what it had offered him for the defense of indigent clients,
(T. 37). Thus, because of appellant's unwillingness to accept the Commission's proffered payment, the Commission
decided that it would be in the best interest of the clients
and in the best interest of Davis County to write the letter
to Judge Swan requesting that appellant not be appointed
to represent indigent clients in Davis County, (T. 37). The
purpose of the letter was not to control who should be appointed as counsel to defend indigent defendants, but the
letter was primarily written to protect appellant's clients and
the interests of Davis County, (T. 37).
Therefore, the request contained in the letter was not
offensive or contradictory to Section 77-64-6 of U .C.A.,
1953, as amended, or to the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure.
Thus, there is nothing in the record which indicates
that the Davis County Commission has attempted to usurp
the court's authority in appointing counsel for indigent defendants under U.C.A. 77-64-6 (1 ).
Under U.C.A. 77-64-6(1 ), the County Commission is
charged with the responsibility of compensating appointed
counsel. Appellant alleges that, "the Davis County Criminal Defense Program is void because it requires the trial
court, in the absence of a filing of a complaint and a trial
thereon, to express an opinion as to the amount of money
which should be paid on a given claim," (Brief of Appellant, p. 7). Appellant's argument in this regard has no
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merit because the record shows that at the time appellant
submitted his claim to the Davis County Commission, the
trial court was not required to express an opinion as to the
amount of money which should have been paid appellant
(T. 21). That is, the trial judge was not required to approve
appellant's vouchers, (T. 21 ).
Also, there is testimony in the transcript which indicates that whenever the County Commissioners sought outside recommendations from the trial court or the Davis
County Attorney on appellant's claim they (the commissioners) never ever sought specifically for advice with regard to
the reasonableness of the dollar amounts charged per hour,
(T. 33, T. 34). Rather, the advice sought from the trial
judge or Davis County Attorney was regarding the reasonable·
ness of the amount of time spent and listed, not the fee to
be spent. The fee schedule had already been set by the
county commission, (T. 34).
Thus, even when the trial court's signature was required on vouchers for claims against the County, the transcript
clearly shows that the ultimate, final and mandatory authority for the payment of any claim was the Davis County Commission, not the trial court, (T. 30). Such ultimate, final
and mandatory authority on the county commission's part
was evidenced by the procedure for paying claims against
Davis County. When the trial judge reviewed the vouchers,
he signed them before they came to the commission, (T. 34).
And before any claim or indebtedness of the county could
be paid, two members of the County Commission had to
sign the vouchers, (T. 30). Therefore the county commission, not the trial judge, was the ultimate authority in paying for appellant's claims against the county, (T. 30).
Appellant, in support of his position, cites the following passage from Washington County vs. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6,
6

447 P.2d 189 (1968), (See Brief of Appellant p. 9-10)
wherein this Honorable Court stated that,
"The court cannot enter into a contract for the
county and should not in the absence of a filing of
a complaint and a trial thereon express an opinion
as to the amount of money which should be paid
on any given claim."
The procedures utilized by Davis County in attempting
payment for appellant's services were entirely consistent
with the Honorable Court's statement in Washington. First,
the district court in Davis County had no authority to "enter
into a contract for the county." As has been shown, the
ultimate, final authority for the payment of any claim was
the Davis County Commission, not the trial court, (T. 30).
The signature of the trial court alone was not sufficient to
bind the county because before any claim or indebtedness
of Davis County could be paid, two members of Davis
County Commission had to sign the vouchers, (T. 30).
Secondly there is testimony in the transcript which indicates the trial court was not asked to "express an opinion
as to the amount of money which should be paid on any
given claim." Such testimony indicates that the advice
sought from the trial court was regarding the reasonableness
of the amount of time spent and listed, not the fee to be
spent, (T. 34). Recall that the fee schedule had already
been set by the county commission, (T. 34).
Therefore, the payment procedures set up by Davis
County were completely compatible with this Honorable
Court's opinion in Washington.
POINT II
THE DA VIS COUNTY CRIMINAL DEFENSE PROGRAM'S RATES OF COMPENSATION WERE NOT
ARBITRARILY FIXED AND ARE REASONABLE
FOR ATTORNEYS ASSIGNED TO DEFEND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS.
7

Paragraph 3006A (d) of 18 U.S.C. was one of the bases
for the compensation provisions of the Davis County Criminal
Defense plan as it relates to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.
(T. 47). But, 18 U.S.C. 3006A (d) was not the sole basis of
the fee schedule, (T. 50).
Other considerations were made in determining what a
reasonable fee would be, (T. 51 ).
The first consideration was that the county commission
had paid nothing before for attorney's fees claimed in repre· '
senting indigent clients, (T. 51 ).
The second consideration was that the defense of indig- '
ents by attorneys is a function of their being officers of the
court, (T. 51 ). That is, the defense of indigents by attorneys
is not a money-making proposition, (T. 51 ). From this consideration the inference can be drawn that the setting of a
fee which is reasonable for defending an indigent person
may well fall at a lower rate than for defending a private
citizen because the attorney is acting as an officer of the
court, not in a private income-making function, (T. 51 ).
Thus, what may be a reasonable fee charged by an attorney
for services performed for a regular client may not be a reasonable fee charged for services performed by an attorney as
officer of the court for an indigent client.
The third consideration was that the set amounts tended to come to a figure which would cover most of the over- \
head expenses and fixed costs of practicing attorneys, (T. 51. :
T. 52). This conclusion was reflected by an analysis that
was made as to what fixed costs would be in establishing an
O.E.O. legal defense (Office of Economic Opportunity) office in Davis County, (T. 35, T. 52).
Fourth, based upon the personal experience of the
Davis County Attorney as a private practitioner of law in
operating a law office in Davis County, it was found that
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$10.00 and $15.00 as set forth in the Davis County plan
were reasonable for indigent defense work, (T. 54, T. 55).
It is unfortunate that appellant does not feel that he

received "reasonable" compensation for his services. But
"reasonable" is a relative term, not an absolute. 7 5 C.J .S.,
Reasonable, p. 634. Therefore, what may be a "reasonable"
fee for some attorneys may be "unreasonable" for others.
Thus, it would be impossible for the Davis County Commission to fix a fee schedule which all attorneys would consider reasonable. But before adopting the Criminal Defense
Plan, the Davis County Commission sought to fix a fee
which a group of attorneys would feel to be reasonable, by
submitting the plan (which included the proposed fee schedule) to the Davis County Bar Association, (T. 45).
The Bar Association held several regular meetings, and
several extraordinary meetings in attempting to acquaint bar
members with the plan, (T. 44). Also, copies of the proposed plan were distributed to the Association's members
and considerable discussion was made concerning it, all culminating in a vote wherein the Bar Association overwhelmingly endorsed the program, (T. 45).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the fee schedule
was not arbitrarily set. Rather, the legal profession was given an opportunity to express its reaction thereto. If the
members of the Davis County Bar Association had felt that
the fee schedule was unreasonable it is doubtful that they
would have overwhelmingly endorsed and accepted the
Davis County Criminal Defense Plan. (T. 45, T. 28).
It would, therefore, not seem logical to let one per-

son's (in this case the appellant's) ideas of what constitutes
"reasonable" compensation, outweigh what an entire group
of attorneys, equally licensed to practice law in the State
of Utah as the appellant, felt would be "reasonable" compensation.
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CONCLUSION
In this case, the county has exercised the power of determining what constitutes "reasonable compensation" in a
non-arbitrary manner by virtue of an analysis made regarding
what fixed costs would be in establishing a legal defense office in Davis County, by relying on the personal experience
of the Davis County Attorney in operating a private law office, and by submitting the proposed fee schedule to the Davis County Bar Association for its consideration. That the
members of said organization felt the fee schedule to be reasonable was shown by their overwhelming endorsement of
the Davis County Criminal Defense Program.
Thus, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

BENNETT P. PETERSON
DA VIS COUNTY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah
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